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THE EFFECT OF LAND USE LEGISLATION ON THE
COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE IN URBAN AREAS
By MAXINE KURTZ

Maxine Kurtz received her B.A.
degree from the University of Minnesota, and her M.S. in Government Management from the University of Denver. She has been a
practicing city planner since 1945,
is a member of the American Institute of Planners and is currently
president of that Institute's Colorado chapter. She has written several articles in the planning field.
She is also a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
The common law governing the non-trespassory invasion of
the peaceful and exclusive use and enjoyment of one's land has its
roots deep in legal history. Most of the legislative land-use regulations in the form of zoning ordinances, building codes, housing
codes, and related enactments, developed after 1898 when the
pioneer architect, Daniel Burnham, discovered how to build skyscrapers.1 Obviously, these statutes, codes, and ordinances apply to
the same subject matter as the common law of nuisance, but in
many instances they do not concur with the common law. This note
analyzes the effect in law and equity of these statutory enactments
on the common law of nuisance.
INTRODUCTION
"Nuisance" is a general term, rather than a term referring to
a specific tort.2 As pointed out by the Colorado Supreme Court, the
failure to observe this fact has led to confusion in the law. 3 Certain
terms of classification are used with precise meaning, however, and
these are defined below in the manner in which they are used here.4
With reference to the effect of the act, nuisances may be public
or private. A public nuisance is one which affects similarly (but
not necessarily in the same degree) all persons coming within the
1 This history has been reviewed many times by the courts when evaluating the general legality
of zoning ordinances, e.g., the leading case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 282 U.S. 365,
386 (1926).
2 Prosser, Torts § 70, comment (2d ed. 1955).
3 Robinson Brick Co. v. Luthi, 115 Colo. 106, 110, 169 P.2d 171, 173 (1946).
4 Derived from King v. Columbia Carbon Co., 152 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1945); Black, Law Dictionary
1215 (4th ed. 1951); 3 Bouvier, Law Dictionary 2379-84 (Rawle's 3d Rev. 1914); Joyce, Nuisances chs.
1-2 (1906); Prosser, op. cit. supra note 2, at 389-90; Webster, New Twentieth Century Unabridged Dictionary 1146 (1954); 28A Words and Phrases 647-56 (Perm. ed., 1955) (nuisance); 35 Id. 172-74 (public
nuisance); 33 Id. 693-97 (private nuisance); and 27 Id. 406-07 (mixed nuisance).
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extent of the range of operation of the act. A private nuisance is
one which causes pecuniary loss in the property interest of an individual or a few persons, or one which causes danger or substantial discomfort to the person or persons having an interest in
the use and enjoyment of the property affected. Mixed nuisances
are both public and private.
Nuisances classified by the character of the act itself include
nuisances per se (nuisance at law), statutory nuisances, and
nuisances per accidens (nuisance in fact). A nuisance per se is a
nuisance at all times and under all circumstances, regardless of
location or surroundings. A statutory nuisance is an act which has
been declared to be a nuisance by legislative enactment, and frequently is defined by the statute as a misdemeanor. A nuisance per
accidens is a lawful act which may become a nuisance by reason of
the circumstance or of the location and surroundings. This last test
of nuisance is sometimes called the "pig in the parlor" test, as given
in the dictum by Mr. Justice Sutherland in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.5
The normal rules of equity jurisdiction apply fully in the
nuisance field: notably, the refusal of the equity court to enjoin
the possible commission of a criminal act, the refusal of equity to
act when there is an adequate remedy at law, and the refusal of
equity to act when the balancing of the equities of the case does
not show a remedy which will result in substantial justice.
Public nuisances are offenses against the state, and hence only
the state may act to abate the nuisance or to punish the offender.
In contrast, a private nuisance inflicts special damage on specific
property owners, and the property owners so adversely affected
may bring civil suit for injunction or for recovery of damages.
Equity will not enjoin a criminal nuisance, with the possible exception of a purpresture. 6 However, private nuisances may be enjoined,
and under some circumstances, a public nuisance may also be
enjoined if the hazard is great enough. A public nuisance may also
be a private nuisance if it results in special damage to particular
property owners, and provided that the special damage is different
in character from the element causing the public nuisance. In such
an event, both sets of rules i.e., rules governing both public and
private nuisances apply to the act.
If the nuisance is of the type which is subject to equity jurisdiction, the court will enjoin a nuisance per se before it has been commenced. It may also enjoin a nuisance per accidens before the act
has commenced if the evidence is undisputed that the act in that
location would be a nuisance, no matter how carefully conducted.
Clearly, then, no zoning ordinance is necessary to support a suit
for an injunction against a potential nuisance per accidens, prior to
the commencement of the use. 7 However, in the absence of a zoning ordinance or restrictive covenant, courts are reluctant to grant
5282 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
6 An obstruction to a public way.
7 Mutual Service Funeral Homes v. Fehler, 257 Ala. 354, 58 So. 2d 770, 774 (1952).
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such injunctions against any lawful use.8 A recent Pennsylvania
decision has gone even further by stating unequivocally: "When
owners of real estate in a residential area desire to preserve their
neighborhood in an unchanged condition, they must secure appropriate zoning ordinances or be protected by building restrictions."9
One of the strongest cases in this group is Dill v. Excel Packing Co.,10 decided late in 1958 by the Kansas Supreme Court. In this
case, a suburban subdivision was opened some six miles from
Wichita in an agricultural area. The County Commissioners had
zoned to a depth of three miles from the city limits, but the developers located this subdivision beyond that zoning control. In a
strongly-worded opinion, the court observed that if one wants to
enjoy the advantages of country life and to escape the limitations
and costs of city living, he must also accept the disadvantages of a
rural environment, including the absence of legislative or equity
protection against the operation across the road of a feed-lot for
3,000 head of cattle.
Government, particularly on the municipal level, commonly
regulates the use of land as a means of accomplishing affirmative
public ends. This is an exercise of the police power, and involves
no compensation to the owners as distinguished from eminent
domain proceedings. The effects on adjacent land owners are merely
incidental, and are not relevant to the issues either of the legitimacy
of the ends or of appropriateness of the means. It is the effect of
this group of enactments, as contrasted to statutory nuisances,
which is examined in this note.
The exercise of the police power may take several forms. In
the first form, the government may establish a land use incidentally
to a direct exercise of its police powers. For instance, a city might
develop and operate.a park or an airport.
The second form of exercise of the police power consists of the
order to, or authorization of, a specific private party to devote spe8 Roberts v. Rich, 200 Ga. 322, 37 S.E.2d 401 (1946); Moss v. Burke & Trotti, 198 La. 76, 3 So. 2d
281 (1941); Garrett v. Borough of Beaver, 367 Pa. 626, 81 A.2d 900 (1951); Menger v. Pass, 367 Pa.
432, 80 A.2d 702 (1951). But see Yaffe v. City of Fort Smith, 178 Ark. 406, 10 S.W.2d 886 (1928);
Densmore v. Evergreen Camp W. of W., 61 Wash. 230, 112 Pac. 255 (1910).
9 Menger v. Pass, 367 Pa. 432, 80 A.2d 702, 703 (1951).
10 183 Kan. 513, 311 P.2d 539 (1958). Compare People ex rel. Gershberg v. Arkow, 204 Misc. 635,
124 N.Y.S.2d 704 (New York City Magis. Ct. 1953) (converse proposition: if people want city conveniences, they must also tolerate city inconveniences).
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cific land to a specific use. Most commonly, this takes the form of a
franchise either to a public utility for the installation of power
lines or service mains, or to a railroad or transit company for the
construction of tracks and related structures. Occasionally, the
specific use is not clearly "vested with the public interest" as the
examples cited.
The third form of exercising the police power is a general
limitation on the private development of land for the promotion of
the public health, safety, welfare, or morals. This has been a long
and increasingly complex development of the law, paralleling the
growth of urban communities and the increasing mechanization of
all aspects of modern life. 1
Four of the five most common land use regulations have only
one or two clearly defined public purposes. Probably the earliest
of the four was fire districting, in which certain areas of the city
were designated, and within those areas, no construction materials
below a certain level of fire resistance could be used. Obviously,
these regulations were enacted as a reaction to the great conflagrations which swept most modern cities at some time during their
early years, such as the Denver fire of 1863 and the famous Chicago
fire. A decision upholding such regulations was rendered as early
as 1838 in New York.12 These regulations have remained
13 essentially
without change in form or purpose to the present day.
Until 1898, the construction methods of the times limited the
height of buildings without any need for legislation. However, the
technology of skyscraper construction was discovered in that year,
and almost at once, a problem arose from the fact that the buildings were being built higher than water could be raised in fire
hoses. Again as an obvious fire protection measure, major cities
began to limit the height of buildings.' 4 These regulations soon
merged into zoning ordinances. With modern construction practices
of using standpipes, sprinkler systems, automatic fire alarm systems, and highly fire-resistive materials, absolute height limit requirements are either being retained for other purposes or gradually are disappearing altogether.' 5
The modern building code is a somewhat more complex regulation, covering both fire-resistive qualities and the strength of
materials. Some reasons for the regulation are: (1) fire protection,
and (2) need for strength to support both natural loads such as the
weight of snow and the pressure of winds, and artificial loads such
as machinery.' 6
Housing codes came into being about 1900, with the New York
City Tenement House Act, regulating "railroad flats." Since then,
11 See the review of the development of this body of low in the leading case of Gorieb v. Fox,
274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927).
12 Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige 261 (New York Ch. 1838).
13 E.g., Denver, Colo., Building Code §§ 601-05 (1949, as amended), which is the most recent version
of a fire districting system started by Denver, Colo., Ordinance 92, Series of 1873. (The Denver Building Code is not part of the Denver Rev. Municipal Code, and is published separately.)
14 See Welch v. Swosey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N.E. 745 (1907); Cochran v. Preston, 108 Md. 220, 70
Atl. 113 (1908).
15 E.g., compare height limits in Denver, Colo. Rev. Municipal Code, § 610 prior to 1955 ("1925 zon.
ing ordinance") with the present provisions in that section relating to bulk planes.
16 E.g., Denver, Colo., Building Code, Ordinance 140, (1949, as amended).
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the codes have become more comprehensive and increasingly
strict in the definitions of housing fit for human occupancy. Characteristically, these codes contain minimum standards of space per
person, amount of light and air required within the structure, and
water and sanitation installations. The purpose is preservation of
the public health, primarily through control of contagious
diseases.
17
Most major American cities now have such regulations.
The fifth type of land-use regulation is zoning. It differs in
character from the preceding four types of regulation primarily
because of its complexity of purpose and because of its regulation
of the geographic location of land use as well as the manner of land
use. Legally, zoning and nuisance are not the same,' 8 but the two
elements of difference between zoning and the other regulations
have led zoning to be widely mistaken for some sort of codified
nuisance legislation. This error may not be explicit, but it is back
of every application for an amendment, a variance, an exception,
or legal relief from allegedly unreasonable regulations, when those
requests are based on the plea that the neighbors do not object, or
that the proposed exemption would not hurt the other property
owners in the area. In law, the zoning ordinance is a vehicle for
achieving a number of public ends simultaneously. The standard
statement of zoning purpose is:
Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a
comprehensive plan, and designed to lessen congestion in
the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic and other
dangers; to promote health and the general welfare; to
provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to
facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water,
sewerage, schools, parks and other public requirements.
Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the district and
its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view
to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the
most appropriate use of land. .. 19
Almost every zoning
enabling act in the country contains this
20
exact language.
Different problems are presented by (1) complying with the
permissive aspects of these ordinances, and (2) violating the prohibitive aspects of these ordinances.
17 E.g., Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code 1 630 (1950, as amended).
18 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 282 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (in considering zoning, one reasons by analogy from the field of nuisance); Beverly Oil Co. v. Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 2d 552, 254 P.2d
865, 869 (1953) (nuisance is not the basis of zoning); Robinson Brick Co. v. Luthi, 115 Colo. 106, 111,
169 P.2d 171, 173 (1946) (zoning preempts the field of public nuisance); Webb v. Alexander, 202 Ga.
436, 43 S.E.2d 668, 672 (1947) (violation of a zoning ordinance is not a public nuisance). Contra, a
series of Louisiana cases, of which New Orleans v. Liberty Shop, 157 La. 26, 101 So. 798, 799 (1924)
is the leading case, holding that a violation of a zoning ordinance is a nuisance per se. See also the
text accompanying notes 50-61 infra regarding the effect of compliance with a regulatory ordinance on
the issue of private nuisance, and text accompanying notes 62-74 infra regarding equity jurisdiction
over violation of a regulatory ordinance.
19 U.S. Department of Commerce, A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 3 (1924), in G. B. Smith,
Law and Pratice of Zoning 429 (1937).
20 In Colorado, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-60-3 (1953), and Denver City Charter, § 219A-C (1953
compilation).
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LAND USE NuISANCE LIABILITY OF GOVERNMVENT

For the purpose of this discussion, governments must be divided into two classes: the state and its political subdivisions, and
the governmental corporations vested with general or limited
municip-l tiwers. The first class consists of the state itself, counties and school districts. Counties and school districts, as agencies
of the state, exercise the delegated sovereign power of the state.
The second group is comprised of cities and towns, 21 and a wide
variety of special districts organized to carry out limited functions
22
such as fire protection, sewage removal, and provision of water.
The first group of governments presumably exercise only the
sovereign power of the state. 23 Historically, the exercise of this
sovereign power was immune both from suit and from liability,
under the common law maxim: "The King can do no wrong." In
this analysis,
it is presumed that immunity from suit has been
24
waived.
The common law immunity from liability is carried over most
strongly in the equity court, where no injunction would be granted
against the operation of a structure maintained as an25 incident to
the exercise of the police power, such as a courthouse.
However, at law damages were allowed for personal injuries
resulting from the maintainance of a nuisance incidental to an
exercise of the police power;26 and, under certain circumstances, so
were damages for injury to property interests. Two different
theories were used to grant this latter relief. In some states, the
tort liability theory was ignored, and recovery was allowed under
the eminent domain theory that property could not be damaged
27
for a public purpose without the payment of just compensation.
In other states, recovery for property damage resulting from maintenance of a public
facility may be recovered under a nuisance lia28
bility theory.
The second class of governmental units, existing in corporate
form with limited or general municipal powers, is considered in
most instances to exist for "the improvement of their own territory and the property of their citizens. ' 29 These municipal powers
are frequently termed "proprietary powers," and include businesses run by the city such as utility systems30 and transportation
21 Colo. Const., amend. XX; Colo. Rev. Stat. ch. 139 (1953).
22 Colo. Rev. Stat. ch. 88 (1953).
23 However, the once-clear character of counties has gradually become blurred as they assume
municipal powers to govern unincorporated urban areas. See Farnik v. County Comm'rs, 341 P.2d 467
(Colo. 1959).
24 See Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957).
25 Liebman v. Richmond, 103 Cal. App. 354, 284 Poc. 731 (1930).
26 Id. (dictum); cases cited in Annot., 75 A.L.R. 1196 (1931).
27 Dayton v. Ashville, 185 N.C. 12, 115 S.E. 827 (1923); see Colo. Const., art. II,1 15.
28 District of Columbia v. Totten, 5 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 562 (1925), and
numerous cases cited therein; State ex rel.Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 79 N.E.2d 698 (Ohio
C.P. 1947).
29 Portsmouth v. Mitchell Mfg. Co., 113 Ohio St.
250, 148 N.E. 846, 847 (1925).
30 Harms v. City of Beatrice, 142 Neb. 219, 5 N.W.2d 287 (1942) (water); Portsmouth v. Mitchell
Mfg. Co., supra note 29, (sewers); cases cited in Annat., 43 A.L.R. 961 (1925) (sewers).
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31
systems,
and governmental activities having no state counter32
part.

A land use operated under a proprietary power is subject to
the same liability as though that land were operated by private
interests. Normally, the uses can not be enjoined in advance, since
it is presumed that (1) the activity is not a nuisance per se; and
(2) that the activity will not be so conducted as to become a nuisance per accidens.33 Since municipalities derive their authority from
the state, the law for exercise of that authority is pursuant to
statutory or constitutional authorization. Hence, it cannot be a
public nuisance.34 In evaluating a private nuisance per accidens,
the court weighs the equities in determining what, if any, abatement should be ordered.3 5 When such a nuisance is conducted by
a municipality, the public necessity aspect of the activities weighs
heavily against any total abatement, and most partial abatements.36
In general, this same strong public utility aspect does not apply
when damages are the issue. Damages usually are awarded
unless
37
the nuisance is the very thing authorized by the state.
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORIZATION OF USES VESTED WITH PUBLIC INTEREST

Whenever an owner devotes his land to public use, or to a use
for the benefit of the public, his activity becomes vested with the
public interest, and subject to a greater degree of governmental
regulation than ordinary private enterprise.3 8 The most common
examples of these enterprises vested with the public interest are
privately-owned public utilities (water, sewage removal, electricity, gas); common carriers, and communication transmission enterprises (telephone, telegraph, television, radio). Within any geo39
graphic region, other particular uses, such as grain elevators,
40
41
irrigation ditch companies, and coal mines may also become
vested with the public interest.
The degree of public importance varies, both between different kinds of enterprise and within any given enterprise. Some
uses are granted the power of eminent domain, 42 and others are
merely regulated. 43 For the purposes of developing the statement
of law on the former type of enterprise, railroading is used as the
31 David v. New Orleans Public Belt R.R., 155 La. 504, 99 So. 419 (1923); cases cited in Annot..
31 A.L.R. 1306 (1924).
32 Denver v. Porter, 126 Fed. 288 (8th Cir. 1903) (dumps are municipal, not sovereign); Williams v.
Longmont, 109 Colo. 567, 129 P.2d 110 (1942) (parks are proprietary). Far development of the general
disagreement regarding the legal nature of waste and garbage collection and disposal, see cases cited
in Annot., 63 A.L.R. 334 (1929); Annot., 156 A.L.R. 718 (1945); and Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 1135 (1957).
33 City of Lynchburg v. Peters, 145 Va. 1, 133 S.E. 674 (1926).
34 State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, Y9 N.E.2d 698, 707 (Ohio C.P. 1947).
35 City of Lynchburg v. Peters, 145 Va. 1, 133 S.E. 674 (1926); cases cited in Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d
1135 (1957), and Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1178 (1955).
36 State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 79 N.E.2d 698 (Ohio C.P. 1947).
37 Cases cited in Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1178 (1955) and Annot.. 156 A.L.R. 718 (1945).
38Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876).
39 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. ,113 (1876).
40 Colo. Rev. Stat., J 50-2-1 (1953).
41 Colo. Rev. Stat., § 92-12-1 (1953).
42 Colo. Rev. Stat., § 50-2-1 (1953). See also comments in Beseman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 50 N.J.L.
235, 13 AtI. 164 (Sup. Ct. 1888) (significance of eminent domain in determining degree of public interest).
43 H. H. Howard v. Etchieson, 310 S.W.2d 473, 474 (Ark. 1958); State v. WOR-TV Tower, 39 N.J.
Super. 583, 121 A.2d 764, 767 (Ch. 1956).
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example.4 4 The same general principles apply to other 45privatelyowned enterprises having the power of eminent domain.
The very purpose for which a railroad is created is the carrying of persons and freight on trains moving on tracks. Hence, the
railroad is not liable for incidental nuisance which might result
from the proper carrying out of the function of running trains on
tracks. 46 However, in Colorado, the power of eminent domain
granted to the railroads requires the payment for damage to private
property adversely
affected by the operation, irrespective of the law
47
of nuisance.
The problem of terminals, roundhouses, switching yards, and
other accessory structures and uses is treated somewhat differently
among the various states. A majority of states hold that these are
essential activities to railroading, and, if properly operated, they
enjoy the same legislative immunity from nuisance liability as the
running of the train on the tracks. A minority, hold that the location of these facilities is optional with the railroad, and hence is essentially private in character. In these minority states, there is no
absolute immunity from nuisance liability, but a strong public interest48 enters into the weighing of the equities in injunction actions.
Regardless of whether the state in question follows the majority
or the minority view on the issue of whether a properly operated
facility constitutes a nuisance, there is unanimity in the view that
if the nuisance results from the improper operation of any facility,
the actor is liable. The legislative authorization was 49only for the
properly operated function, and not for the nuisance.
When the use affected with the public interest is merely regulated, it has full liability for private nuisance, but no liability for
public nuisance.
COMPLIANCE WITH GENERAL PERMISSION LEGISLATION

Many municipal regulations permit or authorize various clas-es
of land uses provided that such uses are conducted in ac-ordan e
with the provisions of the ordinance. The effect of such ordinances
on the law of nuisance has been the subject of considerable confusion, largely due to the use of overly-inclusive terminology. Within the last decade and a half, the courts have been engaged in clarifying the effects of these regulatory ordinances on various types
of nuisance.
The Colcrado Supreme Court holds that a zoning ordinance
pre-empts the field of public nuisance.5" Several older cases added
the proposition that a use permitted by a zoning ordinance, and
44 This discussion is based on cases cited in Annots. at 69 A.L.R. 1188 (1930), 6 A.L.R. 723 (1920),
and 6 A.L.R. 713 (1920), supplemented by specific later cases as indicated.
45 Dudding v. Automatic Gas Co., 145 Tex. 1, 193 S.W.2d 517 (1956).
46 Beseman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 50 NJ.L. 235, 13 Ati. 164 (Sup. Ct. 1888).
47 Colo. Rev. Stat., § 50-1-1 (1953).
48 Van Cortlondt v. New York Cent. R.R., 139 Misc. 892, 250 N.Y.S. 298, 314 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1931), rev'd, 238 App. Div. 132, 263 N.Y.S. 842 (1933), rev'd, 265 N.Y. 249, 192 N.E. 401 (1934).
49 Cf. Westville v. Whitney Home Builders, 32 N.J. Super. 538, 108 A.2d 660 (Ch. 1954).
50 Robinson Brick Co. v. Luthi, 115 Colo. 106, 169 P.2d 171 (1946).
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operated in a careful and efficient manner, cannot be enjoined as
a nuisance per se.51
In the field of private nuisance, the majority rule appears to be
that the zoning ordinance is not a bar to the institution of an action
against a nuisance per accidens. The equity courts are divided on
whether injunctive relief may be granted against such activities
as are permitted by the zoning ordinance, and operated in a careful
and efficient manner. Precedent is not strong in the equity court,
and hence the courts do not feel bound by the earlier decisions in
terms of the nature of relief granted in any specific52 case. Within
53
this limitation, there is some indication that Colorado, New York,
55
54
Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania would tend to refuse injunctive
relief against an activity which is permitted by a zoning ordinance,
and which is carefully and efficiently conducted. The states of
51 Kirk v. Mabis, 215 Iowa 769, 246 N.W. 759 (1933); Salvation Army v. Frankenstein, 22 Ohio App.
159, 153 N.E. 277, 278 (1926); Linsler v. Booth Undertaking Co., 120 Wash. 177, 206 Pac. 976, 978
(1922). See also Robinson Brick Co. v. Luthi, supra note 50; Glenmore Distilleries Co. v. Fiorella, 273
Ky. 549, 117 S.W.2d 173, 177 (1938) (conformity with fire prevention code).
52 Robinson Brick Co. v. Luthi, 115 Colo. 106, 169 P.2d 171 (1946).
53 Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (1932); Key v. Pearliris
Realty Corp., 106 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1951). Contra, Sweet v. Campbell, 282 N.Y. 146, 25 N.E.2d
963 (1940); Moore v. United States Crematorium Co., 158 Misc. 621, 286 N.Y.S. 639 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County), rev'd, 247 App. Div. 637, 291 N.Y.S.289 (1936), rev'd, 275 N.Y. 105, 9 N.E.2d 795, (1937).
54 Weaver v. Bishop, 174 Okla. 492, 52 P.2d 853 (1935) (contains a good analysis of the legal development of this point up to that date).
55 Walker v. Delaware County Trust Co., 314 Pa. 257, 171 AtI. 458 (1934). But see Appeal of Perrin, 305 Pa. 42, 156 AtI. 305 (1931).
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Alabama, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and Texas
appear to hold the view that the provisions of a proper zoning
ordinance are persuasive but not controlling on the issue of
whether injunctive relief should be granted under these conditions.56 Spot zoning 57 is not persuasive or controlling.5 8
Prior to 1935, California also held that a use could be enjoined
as a nuisance, even when permitted by the zoning ordinance and
operated in a careful and efficient manner.59
In 1935, section 731a of the California Code of Civil Procedure
was adopted, reading in part:
"Whenever any city, city and county, or county shall
have established zones or districts under authority of law
wherein certain manufacturing or commercial uses are expressly permitted, no person or persons, firm or corporation
shall be enjoined or restrained by the injunction process
from the necessary operation in any such commercial or
industrial zone of any use expressly permitted therein;
nor shall such use be deemed a nuisance without evidence
of the employment of unnecessary and injurious methods
of operation."
A series of subsequent cases indicates that the effect of this legislation is to put California among the states holding that injunctive relief will not be granted against uses conducted in accord with
zoning ordinances, if such uses are conducted carefully and efficiently.6 0
If the permitted use results in a nuisance per accidens, law
courts will award damages.6 1
VIOLATION OF REGULATORY ORDINANCES

Violation of regulatory ordinances has, by definition, the legal
remedy of fine or imprisonment or both. Relief may also be had
through injunction or abatement proceedings in some circumstances.
Early cases held that violation of a regulatory ordinance would
not confer jurisdiction on an equity court for granting an injunction. If the "merely" illegal act was also a common law nuisance,
it could be enjoined, but the issue of illegality was irrelevant to
56 Shell Oil Co. v. Edwards, 236 Ala. 4, 81 So. 2d 535, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 885 (1955); Dawson
v. Laufersweiler, 241 Iowa 850, 43 N.W.2d 726 (1950); Weltshe v. Graf, 323 Mass. 498, 82 N.E.2d 795
(1948); Rockenbach v. Apostle, 330 Mich. 338, 47 N.W.2d 636 (1951); Kosich v. Poultrymen's Service
Corp., 136 N.J. Eq. 571, 43 A.2d 15 (Ch. 1945); Stohf v. Passaic Piece Dye Works, 108 N.J. Eq. 46, 153
AtI. 707, (Ch. 1931); Dunaway v. Austin, 290 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
57 Spot zoning is the establishment of a different zone on a land area than that zone applied to
the surrounding area, when the difference is for the peculiar benefit of the owner of the land rather
than for the public interest; a type of unconstitutional private legislation.
58 Harris v. Skirving, 41 Wash. 2d 200, 248 P.2d 407 (1952); Shell Oil Co. v. Edwards, 236 Ala. 4,
81 So. 2d 535 (1955) (dictum).
59 Fendley v. City of Anaheim, 110 Cal. App. 731, 294 Pac. 769 (Dist. Ct. App. 1930); Williams v.
Blue Bird Laundry Co., 85 Cal. App. 388, 259 Pac. 484 (Dist. Ct. App. 1926).
60 Gelfand v. O'Haver, 33 Cal. 2d 218, 200 P.2d 790 (1948); Wheeler v. Gregg, 90 Cal. App. 2d
348, 203 P.2d 37 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949); North Side Property Owners Ass'n v. Hillside Memorial Park,
70 Cal. App. 2d 609, 161 P.2d 618 (Dist. Ct. App. 1945); McNeill v. Redington, 67 Cal. App. 2d 315,
154 P.2d 428 (Dist. Ct. App. 1944).
61 Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d 265, 288 P.2d 507 (1955); Robinson Brick Co. v.
luthi, 115 Colo. 106, 169 P.2d 171 (1946); Fairfax Oil Co. v. Bolinger, 186 Okla. 20, 97 P.2d 574 (1939)
(contains a review of the law to that date).
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the proceedings.6 2 However, when it was questionable whether the
act was a common law nuisance, an ordinance declaring the act to
be a nuisance coupled with a showing of 63special damages was
adequate to sustain an action for injunction.
A few states define the violation of a zoning ordinance to be
6 4
a public nuisance, and judically authorize injunctive proceedings.
More commonly, however, legislative authorization
is employed to
65
aid in enforcement of the zoning regulations.
The courts of the various states are in conflict in their attitude
toward parties in injunctive proceedings. Some hold that a private
citizen is not entitled to an injunction against a violation of the
zoning ordinance, since this is a public nuisance.6 6 Others hold that
if the zoning violation is also a nuisance per accidens, it may be
enjoined by citizen action. 67 Still others have held that a zoning
violation is a nuisance per se, and hence enjoinable by citizen action
at any time.6 8 In Colorado,
as in many other states, this last right
69
is established by statute.
A nonconforming use under a zoning ordinance is a special
problem. It is a use which was lawful when the zoning ordinance
was adopted (or amended), but which does not comply with the
zoning ordinance at the time in question. Technically, its status is
that of a use which is tolerated but not encouraged. In general, legislatively-imposed limitations on its continuance have been upheld; 70 but in the absence of such limitations, the courts tend to treat
62 Philbrick v. Miami, 147 Fla. 538, 3 So. 2d 144 (1941) (zoning); Jacobsen v. Padgett, 108 So. 2d
303 (Fla. App. 1958) (zoning); First National Bank v. Sarils, 129 Ind. 201, 28 N.E. 434 (1891) (fire
zones); Houlton v. Titcomb, 102 Me. 272, 66 AtI. 733 (1906) (fire zones); Village of Port Austin v. Parsons, 349 Mich. 629, 85 N.W.2d 120 (1957) (setback ordinances); Village of St. Johns v. McFarlan, 33
Mich. 72 (1875) (fire zones); Warren v. Cavanaugh, 33 Mo. App. 102 (1888) (location of stone quarries); Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige 261 (N.Y. Ch. 1838) (size and location of pressed hay factory in .fire
zone); Wampum v. Moore, 34 Wis. 450 (1874) (fire zones).
6 Levine v. Board of Adjustment, 125 Conn. 478, 7 A.2d 222 (1939); Town of Grundy Center v.
Marion, 231 Iowa 425, 1 N.W.2d 677 (1942); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public
Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936); Eskridge v. Sandusky, 136 N.E.2d 465 (Ohio C.P. 1955); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Wright, 124 Okla. 55, 254 Pac. 41
(1927); Shields v. Spokane School Dist., 31 Wash. 2d 247, 196 P.2d 352 (1948).
64 New Orleans v. Liberty Shop, 157 La. 26, 101 So. 798 (1924); New Orleans v. Lafon, 61 So.
2d 270 (La. App. 1952); Morris v. Borough of Haledon, 24 N.J. Super. 171, 93 A.2d 781 (App. Div.
1952) (slightly modified); Riccardi v. Board of Adjustment, 394 Pa. 624, 149 A.2d 50 (1959); Molnar v.
George B. Henne & Co., 377 Pa. 571, 105 A.2d 325 (1954).
65 Colo. Rev. Stat., § 139-60-8 (1953); Denver City Charter, § 219A-H (1953 compilation); Fidelity
Trust Co. v. Downing, 224 Ind. 457, 68 N.E.2d 789 (1946); Portage Township v. Full Salvation Union,
318 Mich. 693, 29 N.W.2d 297 (1947); Young v. Scheu, 56 Hun 307, 9 N.Y.S. 349 (Sup. Ct. 1890). Cf.
Webb v. Alexander, 202 Ga. 436, 43 S.E.2d 668 (1947), which holds that a zoning violation may be
enjoined under an enabling statute relative t, public nuisance if the violation is proved to be a public
nuisance.
66 City and County of Son Francisco v. Safeway Stores, 150 Cal. App. 2d 327, 310 P.2d 68 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1957); O'Brien v. Turner, 255 Mass. 84, 150 N.E. 886 (1926).
67 Hopkins v. MacCullock, 35 Cal. App. 2d 442, 95 P.2d 950 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939); Biber v. O'Brien,
138 Cal. App. 353, 32 P.2d 425 (Dist. Ct. App. 1934); Smith v. Collison, 119 Cal. App. 180, 6 P.2d 277
(Dist. Ct. App. 1931); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Downing, 224 Ind. 457, 68 N.E.2d 789 (1946); Morris v.
Borough of Haledon, 24 N.J. Super. 171, 93 A.2d 781 (App. Div. 1952); Scott v. Champion Bldg. Co.,
28 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
68 McCartney v. Schuette, 243 Iowa 358, 54 N.W.2d 462 (1952); Stale ex ref. Demo Realty Co. v.
McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613, cert. denied, 230 U.S. 556 (1929); State v. Lew, 25 Wash. 2d 854,
172 P.2d 289 (1946).
69 E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat., 1 139.60-7 (1953); Denver City Charter, I 219A-G (1953 compilation). These
means are indirect, involving proceedings before the Board of Adjustment by "persons aggrievea,"
alleging error by the administrator in deciding not to enforce; reviewable by the courts on writ of
certiorari. This approach does not appear to have been used.
70 City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Beszedes
v. Board of Comm'rs of Arapahoe County, 116 Colo. 123, 178 P.2d 950 (1947); Mercer Lumber Companies v. Village of Glencoe, 390 III. 138, 60 N.E.2d 913 (1945); Dorman v. Baltimore, 187 Md. 678,
51 A.2d 658 (1947); Borough of Rockleigh v. Astral Industries, 23 N.J. Super. 255, 92 A.2d 851 (Ch.
1952); D' Agnostino v. Jaguar Realty Co., 22 N.J. Super. 74, 91 A.2d 500 (Ch. 1952).
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such uses as if they were conforming uses, authorized by the zoning
issued permit does not change
ordinancel Of course, an illegally
72
the status of a zoning violation.
Abatement is the power to force the cessation of uses which
are clearly detrimental to the public health or safety or morals. It
frequently accompanies the grant of power to regulate land uses,
7 3
However,
and sometimes serves as a substitute for the injunction.
74
peril.
his
at
use
a
abates
in Colorado a public official
SUMMARY

Regulatory land use statutes under the police power are not
legislative statements of the law of nuisance. However, when such
statutes deal with the same subject matter as common law public
nuisances, the statutes pre-empt the field.
In the field of private nuisance, a specific legislative authorization bars injunctive relief against the "very" use authorized, provided that the use is conducted in a careful and efficient manner.
An improperly conducted use is not an authorized use. As the permission shifts from mandatory to permissive, and as the degree of
public interest in the use decreases, the effect of the legislative
provisions shifts from being an absolute bar to injunctive relief to
being persuasive evidence. The legal remedy of damages remains
unaffected if the state is one requiring compensation for damages
to land incidental to eminent domain.
In general, violations of land use regulations were not within
the jurisdiction of equity, but this common law rule has generally
been superseded legislatively. However, a violation did not bar a
private nuisance action under the common law.
71 Firthv. Scherzberg, 366 Pa. 443, 77 A.2d 44 (1951); Benjamin v. Lietz, 116 Utah 476, 211 P.2d
(1949).
72 McCartney v. Schuette, 243 Iowa 358, 54 N.W:2d 462 (1952); Hyams v. Amchir, 57 N.Y.S. 2d 77
(Sup. Ct. 1945).
73 Eaton v. Klimm, 217 Cal. 362, 18 P.2d 678 (1933); Armistead v. City of Los Angeles, 152 Cal.
App. 2d 319, 313 P.2d 127 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); First National Bank v. Sarlis, 129 Ind. 201, 28 N.E.
434 (1891); Burley v. City of Annapolis, 182 Md. 307, 34 A.2d 603 (1943); People v. Kelly, 295 Mich.
632, 295 N.W. 341 (1940).
74 McMahon v. City of Telluride, 79 Colo. 281, 244 Pac. 1017 (1926).
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